The concept of the survival signature has recently attracted increasing attention for performing reliability analysis on systems with multiple types of components.
INTRODUCTION
Networked systems are a series of components interconnected by communication paths. The analysis of these systems becomes more and more important as they are the backbone of our societies. Examples include the Internet, social networks of individuals or businesses, transportation network, power plant sys-referred to as reliability analysis, and the survival function is then called reliability function. This survival function or reliability function quantifies the survival probability of a system at a certain point in time. In this context, the concept of the system signature [3] has been recognized as an important tool to quantify the reliability of systems that consist of exchangeable components.
The main advantage of the system signature is its capability to separate the 35 structure of the system from the probabilistic model used to describe the random failure of the system components. Recent advancements using the concept of system signature are reported in [4] . However the use of the system signature is associated with the assumption that all components in the system are of the same type. This is a major limitation since real systems are generally formed 40 by more than one component type so that those systems cannot be analysed with the system signature [5] .
In order to overcome the limitations of the system signature, Coolen and Coolen-Maturi [5] proposed the survival signature as improved concept, which does not rely any more on the restriction to one component type. Specifically, 45 the characteristics of the components do not need to be independently and identically distributed (iid). In the case of a single component type, the survival signature is closely related to the system signature. Recent developments have opened up a pathway to perform a survival analysis using the concept of survival signature even for relatively complex systems. Coolen et al. have shown how 50 the survival signature can be derived from the signatures of two subsystems in both series and parallel configuration [6] , and they developed a non-parametric predictive inference scheme for system reliability using the survival signature [5] . Aslett et al. [7] presented the use of the survival signature for systems reliability quantification from a Bayesian perspective. 55 In many cases, uncertainties cannot be quantified precisely since they are characterized by incomplete information, limited sampling data, ignorance, measurement errors and so on. Thus, a thorough and realistic quantitative assessment of the uncertainties is quite important. Moreover, it is essential to know which component with uncertainties has the biggest influence degree to the 60 whole system. Component importance measure allows to quantify the importance of system components and identify the most "critical" component. It is a useful tool to find weaknesses in systems and to prioritize reliability improvement activities.
Birnbaum [8] proposed a measure to find the reliability importance of a component in 1969, which is obtained by partial differentiation of the system reliability with respect to the given component reliability. An improvement or decline in reliability of the component with the highest importance will cause the greatest increase or decrease in system reliability. Several other importance measures have been introduced [9] . Improvement potential, risk achievement worth, risk 70 reduction worth, criticality importance and Fussell-Vesely's measure were all reviewed in Ref. [10] [11] [12] [13] . To conduct reliability importance of components in a complex system, Wang et al. [14] introduced and presented failure criticality index, restore criticality index and operational criticality index. Zio et al. [15] [16] presented generalized importance measures based on Monte Carlo 75 simulation. The component importance measures can determine wiich components are more important to the system, which may suggest the most efficient way to prevent system fails.
Some of the importance measures can be computed through analytical methods, but limited to systems with few components. Traditional simulation meth-80 ods provide no easy way to compute component importance [14] . In addition, in case with imprecision in the component failure, the simulation approaches become intractable.
In this paper, a novel reliability approach and component importance measure based on survival signature is proposed to analyse systems with multiple 85 types of components. The proposed approach allows to include explicitly imprecision and vagueness in the characterization of the uncertainties of system components. The imprecision characterizes indeterminacy in the specification of the probabilistic model. That is, an entire set of plausible probabilistic models is specified using set-values (herein, interval-valued) descriptors for the descrip-90 tion of the probabilistic model. The cardinality of the set-valued descriptors reflects the magnitude of imprecision and, hence, the amount and quality of information that would be needed in order to specify a single probabilistic model with a sufficient confidence. In real cases the amount and quality of information to specify a probabilistic model can be limited to such an extent that the 95 associated magnitude of imprecision makes the entire analysis meaningless. In such cases it is essential to identify those contributions to the imprecision, which influence the results most strongly. Once these are known, targeted measures and investments can be defined in order to reduce the imprecision to enable a meaningful survival analysis. For this purpose, a component importance mea- be grouped together because of the random ordering of the components in the state vector, which leads to a state vector can be written as x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x K ), 120 with x k = (x k 1 , x k 2 , ..., x k m k ) representing the states of the components of type k. Coolen et al. [6] introduced the survival signature for such a system, denoted by Φ(l 1 , l 2 , ..., l K ), with l k = 0, 1, ..., m k for k = 1, 2, ..., K, which is defined to be the probability that the system functions given that l k of its m k components of type k work, for each k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}. There are m k l k state vectors x k with 125 precisely l k components x k i equal to 1, so with m k i=1 x k i = l k (k = 1, 2, ..., K), and S l1,l2,...,l K denote the set of all state vectors for the whole system.
Assume that the random failure times of components of the different types are fully independent, and in addition the components are exchangeable within the same component types, the survival signature can be rewritten as:
.., m k } denotes the number of k components working at time t. Assume that the components of the same type have a known CDF, F k (t) for type k. Moreover, the failure times of different component types are assumed independent, then:
Hence, the survival function of the system with K types of components 135 becomes:
It is obvious from Equation 3 that the survival signature can separate the structure of the system from the failure time distribution of its components, which is the main advantage of the system signature. What is more, the survival signature only need to be calculated once for any system, which is similar to the special case of a system with only one type (K = 1) of components, the survival signature and the Samaniego's signature [3] are directly linked to each other through a simple equation, however, the latter cannot be easily generalized for 145 systems with multiple types (K ≥ 2) of components [5] .
This implies that all attractive properties of the system signature also hold for the method using the survival signature, also the survival signature is easy to apply for systems with multiple types of components, and one could argue it is much easier to interpret than the system signature. 
Introduction of Probability Box
As stated in the previous section, the probability of the failure of each component is described by the CDF, F k (t). However, it is not always possible to 155 fully characterize the probabilistic behaviour of components due to ignorance or incomplete knowledge. This lack of knowledge comes from many sources:
in-adequate understanding of the underlying processes, imprecise evaluation of the related characteristics, or incomplete knowledge of the phenomena. These problems can be tackled by resorting to generalized probabilistic methods, such 160 as imprecise probabilities, see e.g. [17] [18] [19] [20]. The main problem of generalized probabilistic methods is the computational cost associated with their evaluation. In fact, these approaches required multiple probabilistic model evaluations, and often use global optimization procedures [21] . [24] .
The generalized probabilistic model makes the uncertainty quantification a rather challenging task in terms of computational cost, and the challenge comes works for nonparametric predictive inference in [24] . As C k (t) denotes the num-190 ber of k components working at time t, and it is assumed that the components can not be repaired or replaced. The lower survival function is:
where While the corresponding upper bound of the survival function is:
For a system with m components in one type, C t is represented to binomial distribution, with C t ∼ Binomial(m, 1 − F (t)). According to stochastic dominance theory [29], C t increases as (1 − F (t)) increases.
For parametric distribution, the CDF of components failure time can be
which holds for all t.
Here, taking an exponential distribution with parameter λ ∈ [λ 1 , λ 2 ] as an example. It is known that
For a system with one type of components, the lower bound of the survival function for the system at time t becomes:
and the corresponding upper bound of the survival function becomes:
For a system composed of K ≥ 2 types of components, with parameter
, the lower bound of the survival function for the system at time t is:
The corresponding upper bound of the survival function becomes:
To illustrate the method presented in this section, the lower and upper bounds of survival function for the system in Fig. 2 
Simulation Method to Deal with Imprecision within Components Failure
Times 230 Let use the system in Fig. 2 as an example to illustrate the simulation method. The survival signature represents the probability that the system works given that the number of components of each type that are working. The system in Fig. 2 is equivalent to a system composed by two components that can be in four status (status 0 to status 3) as shown in 1. Each status represents the 235 number of the working components.
The method used to simulate the survival function is derived from the approach proposed in [30] . The simulation approach requires the following steps:
(1) Sampling the transition times of the first component type, hence a sequence of transition time t 1 , t 2 and t 4 can be got; (2) Repeating the procedure of step
240
(1) for the component type 2, which will obtain 4 additional transition times;
(3) Reordering all the transition times of (t 1 , t 2 , ..., t 8 ); (4) For each time interval the probability that the system functions can be computed based on survival signature; (5) Repeating the steps (1) to (4) The simulation method can be used for analysing any systems with general imprecision. Suppose components failure times of type 1 and type 2 obey
Weibull distribution and gamma distribution, respectively. Their imprecise parameters can be seen in Table 2 . It is difficult to get the bounds of survival function by analytical method, however, this problem can be tackled through simulation method. The results are shown in Fig. 4 . will allow one to study the relationship among components and the system.
255

Importance measures have many applications in probabilistic risk analysis and
there are many approaches based on various measures of influence and response [32] . These importance measures provide a numerical rank to determine which components are more critical to system failure or more important to system 270 reliability improvement.
A new importance measure is introduced herein as relative importance index indicated by RI, which is utilized to quantify the difference between the probability that the system functions if the ith component works and the probability that the system functions if the ith component is not working. The The relative importance index RI i (t) can be expressed as follows:
Where, P (T S > t | T i > t) represents the probability that the system func- 
Therefore, the lower and upper bounds of relative importance index are: 
Illustrative Example
295
The survival signature of the two circumstances can be expressed as Φ 1 (l 1 , l 2 ) and Φ 0 (l 1 , l 2 ), and the results can be seen in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively.
So: 
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, a survival analysis of a real world hydro power plant based 310 on survival signature is conducted. The system is schematically shown in Fig. 9 and its reliability block diagram is illustrated in Fig. 10 . It can be modelled as a complex system comprising the following main twelve components: (1) control gate (CG), which is built on the inside of the dam, the water from the reservoir is released and controlled through the gate; (2) two butterfly valves (BV 1,BV 2), 315 which can transport and control the water flow; (3) two turbines (T 1,T 2), where the flowing waters kinetic energy is transformed into mechanical energy; (4) three circuit breakers (CB1,CB2,CB3), which are used to protect the hydro power plant system; (5) two generators (G1,G2), which produce alternating current by moving electrons; and (6) two transformers (T X1,T X2), which inside 
current.
Two cases are presented in the following part: Case A presents the survival analysis with the fully probability model; Case B considers imprecision within the model. 325 
Case A
It is assumed that all components of the same type have the same failure time distribution. Failure type and distribution parameters are listed in Table   5 .
Let l 1 , l 2 , l 3 , l 4 , l 5 and l 6 denote CG, BV , T , G, CB and T X, respectively.
330 Table 6 shows the survival signature of the hydro power plant, whereby the rows with values Φ(l 1 , l 2 , l 3 , l 4 , l 5 , l 6 ) = 0 are omitted.
The survival signature can now be used as follows. There are m 1 = 1, m 2 = m 3 = m 4 = m 6 = 2 and m 5 = 3 components of each type. The survival signa- T X Gamma (0.6,1.1) Table 6 : Survival signature of a hydro power plant in Fig.9 ; rows with Φ(l 1 , l 2 , l 3 , l 4 , l 5 , l 6 ) = 0 are omitted l 1 l 2 l 3 l 4 l 5 l 6 Φ(l 1 , l 2 , l 3 , l 4 , l 5 , l 6 ) ). Now consider Φ(1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1) for example. This covers all possible vectors x with x 1 1 = 1, x 2 1 +x 2 2 = 1, x 3 1 +x 3 2 = 1, x 4 1 +x 4 2 = 2, x 5 1 +x 5 2 +x 5 3 = 2 and x 6 1 +x 6 2 = 1. There are 24 such vectors, but only four of these can make the system function.
Due to the iid assumption of the failure times of components of the same type, 340 and due to independence between components of different types, all these 24 vectors have equal probability to occur, hence Φ(1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1) = 4/24 = 1/6. The survival function of the hydro power plant system with twelve components of six types is shown in Fig. 11 . Table 7 .
In the above equations, R S (t) and R i (t) represent the reliability of the system 
Methods
Component Importance Equations
and the ith component at time t. For the power plant in Fig. 9 , the reliability
The component importance obtained at t = 0.12 using the proposed method for the power plant system have been compared with the results Birnbaum's measure (BM ), risk achievement worth (RAW ) and Fussel-Vesely's measure 360 (F V ) as shown in Table 8 . The relative importance index values reveal the component importance over time. The bigger the value of RI i (t) is, the more "critical" the ith component is.
370
The above results show that BV 1 and BV 2 have the same relative importance index values, and the same applies to T 1 and T 2, G1 and G2, CB1 and CB2, T X1 and T X2. This is because the components are in a parallel configuration and they have the same failure time distribution type and parameters, which is also according to our common sense that these components have the same 
Case B
The investigation from CASE A is now extended by considering imprecision in the description of the probabilistic model for the failure characterization of the system components. Intervals are used to describe the imprecision in the 390 failure time distribution as shown in Table 9 . lower survival functions of the hydro power plant system reflecting the epistemic uncertainties as range between the curves, see Fig. 13 . The imprecision from the input is translated into imprecision of the output.
As a further step the imprecision can be carried forward to calculate ranges for the relative importance index. Firstly, ranges for the survival functions 400 assuming given component fails or works are calculated for each component, 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper an efficient approach for analysing imprecise system reliability and component importance has been presented. The method is based on the survival signature, which has been proven to be an effective method to estimate 410 the survival function of systems with multiple component types. In the proposed approach, the system model needs to be analysed only once in order to conduct a reliability analysis and measure a component importance, which represents a importance index values can be obtained.
420
In order to quantify the influence degree of components without and with imprecision, a novel component-wise importance measure has been presented:
the relative importance index. Importance measures allow to identify the most "critical" system component at a specific time. This allows an optimal allocation of resources for repair, maintenance and inspection. This novel and effi-425 cient method is conducted in an analytical way or through simulation method based on survival signature, which improves the computational efficiency. Using 
